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Abstract. Providing for the needs of the vulnerable is a critical compo-
nent of social and health policy-making. In particular, caring for children
and for vulnerable older people is vital to the wellbeing of millions of
families throughout the world. In most developed countries, this care is
provided through both formal and informal means, and is therefore gov-
erned by complex policies that interact in non-obvious ways with other
areas of policy-making. In this paper we present an agent-based model
of social and child care provision in the UK, in which agents can provide
informal care or pay for private care for their relatives. Agents make care
decisions based on numerous factors including their health status, em-
ployment, financial situation, and social and physical distance to those
in need. Simulation results show that the model can reproduce the ob-
served patterns of care need and availability, and therefore can provide
an important aid to this complex area of policy-making. We conclude
that the model’s use of kinship networks for distributing care and the
explicit modelling of interactions between social care and child care will
enable policy-makers to develop more informed policy interventions in
these critical areas.
Keywords: Social Care · Child Care · Kinship Network · Social Policy
“The moral test of government is how it treats those who are in the dawn of
life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, the aged; and those in the
shadows of life, the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”
— Hubert Humphrey Jr.
1 Introduction
One of the most critical, and the most testing, tasks of modern society is the
provision of personal and medical care for people in need of assistance due to age,
disability or other factors. In particular, every society must provide child care for
the care needs of their children, and social care for adults who need some kind
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of help with their activities of daily living (ADLs). In most developed countries,
the state plays an important role in the provision of care for these vulnerable
groups. However, formal and informal care provided within the household or
broader kinship network is often critical to the health outcomes of vulnerable
people. As human lifespans lengthen and birth-rates drop in developed countries,
some governments are confronted by a substantial increase in the demand for
care.
In the UK, for example, the supply of carers is decreasing over time as birth-
rates drop, even while the increasing elderly population requires ever more sup-
port [1]. A recent Age UK report states that almost 50% of over-75s are living
with a long-term illness that limits their ADLs [2]. Given that this age group is
among the fastest-growing in the country, expectations are that the demand for
care will outpace the available carer population.
Consequently, unmet care need is of critical importance to health and social
care policy-making in the UK. Ipsos MORI reports that a majority of the aged
with care needs have at least some unmet care needs [3], while Age UK estimates
that 1.2 million people received insu cient care in 2017 [2]. Carers UK estimates
that in order to meet the skyrocketing levels of care demand, the population of
carers would need to increase by 40% over the next 20 years [4]. According
to Wittenberg and Hu (2015), demand for privately-funded social care is also
expected to rise significantly over a similar period, with expenditure on private
care to nearly triple by 2035 [5].
For the majority of households with social care needs, the problem of meeting
their social care needs is compounded by the need for meeting their family’s child
care needs. According to FullFact, 79% of families in England with children aged
0 to 14 used some form of childcare, with 66% of them using formal childcare,
40% using informal childcare and 28% using both [6]. Moreover, according to
the OECD report Society at a Glance 2016, UK families spend over 30% of their
income on childcare [7]. According to LaingBuisson, the UK market for formal
childcare amounted to £5.5 billion in 2018 [8].
The provision of social care in the UK, is largely dependent on informal care,
or care provided on a volunteer basis by family members. A 2018 report from the
National Audit O ce estimates the value of UK informal care in UK at £100
billion per year [9]. Aldridge and Huges, using data from The Family Resources
Survey 2013/14, report that there were 5.3 million informal carers in the UK [10]
and the Health Survey for England 2017 states that 68% of participants aged 65
and over reported receiving help from unpaid helpers, while 21% said they had
received help from both unpaid helpers and paid helpers [11]. In this regard, the
importance of support and care-giving networks has long been recognized [12].
Keating et all. (2003) reported that informal care is provided mostly through
networks of carers with an average of three to five members, predominantly
composed of an individual’s close relatives [13].
Given the demographic trends outlined above, an increasing number of house-
holds will need to manage their resources to provide for both child care and social
care needs, meaning that in these cases these two types of care are deeply in-
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terrelated. In addition, both the social and child care provision processes taking
place within these households, and their connected care-giving networks, are af-
fected both directly and indirectly by the current government’s child and social
care policies. With that in mind, we propose that understanding how child and
social care need evolves over time, and the socioeconomic processes that under-
line the provision of care, are a vital component in any attempt to develop and
implement e↵ective and sustainable care policies.
In this paper, we propose an agent-based model (ABM) of the UK informal
and privately-funded formal care system, with the goal of capturing the complex
relationships between social and child care, and the impact of social policies on
these processes. This model provides a theoretical framework that enables us
to improve our understanding of the complex care allocation system, where de-
mographic, social and economic factors interact to determine the dynamics of
care demand and supplies. Further, using ABMs enables us to model scenarios
of economic and social policy change, providing a means to test social policies
which are meant to a↵ect child and social care provision, and reveal any possible
unintended side-e↵ects (spillover e↵ects) of those policies prior to implement-
ing them in the real world. Previous work has explored social care provision
and policy solutions using ABMs [14, 15]. This simulation extends these e↵orts
significantly, and models the provision of care not just as a simple transaction
from one agent to another, but as a negotiation conducted across kinship net-
works with reference to numerous social, economic and geographical factors. As
a result, we propose that this model can support inform child and social care
policy-making more comprehensively than other methods.
2 Basics of the model
In this section we provide a summary of the model’s core economic and social
processes. This model is an extension of previous work in Noble et al. [14] and
Silverman et al. [15], adding numerous processes and sub-processes to that basic
framework1. Agents in the virtual UK depicted in this model occupy households,
clusters of which form towns. The sizes of these towns are set with rough corre-
spondence to real UK population densities, scaled down by a factor of 1:10,000.
The simulation runs in one-year time steps; within each year processes taking
place on a weekly scale are modelled. The simulation begins in the year 1860,
which allows su cient time for the population dynamics to stabilise before 1951,
at which point UK Census data is incorporated into the simulation. The simu-
lation finishes in the year 2050.
Given the complexity of this simulation, and the space limitations of this
paper, we provide only brief summaries of some aspects which are explained
in detail elsewhere, and refer readers to those papers for further information.
Changed and additional aspects of the current model are explained here in full.
1 Complete Python 2.7 source code for the simulation is available here:
https://github.com/UmbertoGostoli/CareSim—-Informal-and-Formal-Child-
and-Social-Care/releases/tag/v0.8
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2.1 Agent Life-Course
Agents are classified as children until they reaching the working age of 16. At
this point they can either start looking for work, or continue in education. When
agents reach the retirement age (set by a simulation parameter, with 65 as the
default), they retire from employment and begin receiving a pension based on
their previous income. Mortality rates in the model follow Noble et al. [14] and
use a Gompertz-Makeham mortality model until 1951. From that point we use
mortality rates drawn from the Human Mortality Database [16]. Lee-Carter pro-
jections generate agent mortality rates from 2009.
2.2 Partnership Formation and Dissolution
Once they reach working age, agents can form partnerships. Agents are paired
randomly with probabilities depending on agents’ age, distance from one an-
other, and socioeconomic status. Model parameters set the relative weights of
these factors. Divorce probabilities are age-specific and are checked yearly to
determine whether agents decide to divorce. Age-specific annual divorce proba-
bilities determine whether a couple dissolves their partnership. Fertility rates are
computed similarly to mortality rates, in which data from the Eurostat Statistics
Database [17] and the O ce for National Statistics [18] are used from 1950–2009,
with Lee-Carter projections taking over thereafter.
2.3 Internal migration
Agents can migrate domestically for several di↵erent reasons. Household reloca-
tions happen most frequently due to agents finding a partner or a new job in a
di↵erent town. Male agents will also relocate to new houses once a partnership
dissolves, and any children produced by that partnership stay with the mother.
Retired agents with care needs may move in with their children, with a prob-
ability determined by the available care in that household. Orphaned children
are adopted by a household in their kinship network, or by a random family if
there are no available households in their kinship network.
2.4 Health status and care need
Agents start their lives in a state of good health, and later may enter a state of
care need according to gender- and age-specific probabilities. The five categories
of care need and the amount of hours per week of care required at each level
are shown in Table 1. Once agents have care needs, they do not recover but
continue to progress to higher levels of need over time. The chance of agents
progressing to higher levels of need increases with age and with the sum of the
agent’s past unmet care needs, and decreases with higher socioeconomic status.
We thus assume that long periods of unmet care needs will increase frailty, and
that higher income and wealth allows for high-quality care to be purchased to
increase quality-of-life.
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Table 1. The di↵erent care need categories, with the number of hours of care required
per week
Care need category Weekly hours of care required
None 0
Low 12
Moderate 24
Substantial 48
Critical 96
3 Model Enhancements
This updated version of the Linked Lives model presented in Silverman et al. [15]
has been rewritten from the ground up and substantially extended for greater de-
tail and realism in Gostoli and Silverman [19], where the following features have
been introduced: socio-economic status (SES) groups; kinship networks; formal
(i.e. privately paid-for) care; a salary function; and hospitalization probabilities
(which depend positively on levels of unmet care need). We provide very brief
summaries of the SES, kinship network and formal care provision aspects here,
and refer the reader to Gostoli and Silverman [19] for more details.
3.1 Socioeconomic Status Groups
Agents are placed in one of five socioeconomic status groups (SES groups), based
on the Approximated Social Grade from the O ce for National Statistics. These
groups were redistributed as in Gostoli and Silverman [19]. Wealth is assigned to
agents according to their accumulated income. Agents can move to di↵erent SES
groups by staying in eduction for longer; each SES group is associated with an
education level, which roughly correspond to UK education stages from A-levels
to postgraduate degrees.
3.2 Kinship Networks
Households have kinship networks, which are networks of households having
a kinship relation with any of the household’s inhabitants. We define ‘degrees’
of kinship based on the network distance between households in the network; this
kinship distance value ranges from 0 (same household) to III (uncles/aunts/nieces
/nephews).
When an agent is in a state of care need, the kinship network determines the
supply of care available to that agent. Physical distance also a↵ects care provi-
sion; only households in the same town as the care receiver can provide informal
care. Formal care is restricted by kinship distance, with provision occuring only
at distances 0 and I. Kinship also influences agents’ relocation decisions – agents
prefer to relocate to towns where more of their kinship network is living.
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3.3 Formal Care
Formal care is also allocated through the kinship network. Households can allo-
cate a share of their income to buying formal care; this share increases as the
household’s per-capita income increases. This share also determines the amount
of income the household is prepared to give up to provide formal care; in other
words, agents can elect to reduce their working hours to allow for informal care
provision. In the case of child care, formal care is provided only by the child’s
own household; formal social care, however, can also be provided by the receiver’s
children and parents residing in other households.
4 Child Care
In this updated version of the social care model from Gostoli and Silverman
[19], we included another critical aspect of understanding care provision, which
is child care provision 2. In our model, we assume that all children, except the
newborns (agents of age 0), have the same child care need3. However, the net
care need of each child depends on his age, due to the presence of child care and
education policies, which determine the quantity of child care provided by the
state through nurseries and schools. Newborns are treated as a special case, as
they have a much higher need which is entirely supplied by their mother, who
allocates all of her available supply of care to meet the newborn’s care need.
Although child care and social care seem similar on a surface level, there are
deep di↵erences between these two kinds of care which require us to consider
them and their supply as two separate but interrelated processes. First, in the
UK and most other developed countries there is a parental duty of care defined
by law, while social care mostly rests on a social/moral obligation to care for
one’s relatives. Second, while child care is defined purely by the age of the re-
cipient, social care implies a pathological condition which limits the recipients’
ADLs. Consequently, child care need is usually more predictable than social
care need and can be supplied on a one-to-many basis, whereas social care usu-
ally is delivered on a one-to-one basis. These di↵ering characteristics mean that
child and social care provisions are di↵erent, although interrelated, processes,
the computational implementation of which is discussed in the next section.
5 The care allocation process
The care allocation begins by allocating the available care supply to child care
first, with the remaining resources then used to satisfy social care needs. In
each stage the allocation mechanism randomly samples a receiving household
with a probability proportional to the unmet care need, then a supplying house-
hold is sampled with a probability proportional to the available care supply. A
2 In this model, children are agents of age 0 to 11.
3 We assume that child care need for children aged 1 to 11 is equal to 56 hours per
week.
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care ‘quantum’, equal to 4 hours of care, is then transferred from one member
of the supplying household with available supply to a member of the receiv-
ing household with care need. The type of care transferred is chosen randomly
with probabilities reflecting the relative residual availability of time and income
available for care provision in the sampled care supplying household (unless the
supplier lives in a di↵erent town, in which case only formal care supply is pos-
sible). This process repeats until no households with both unmet care need and
residual care supply exist within the current kinship network.
When a household has both child and social care need, the household will
preferentially allocate informal care to the most expensive variety and formal
care to the least. The cost of child care to consider, however, is not the price of
formal child care: because of the possibility of satisfying child care needs concur-
rently for multiple children, the relevant cost of child care is instead equivalent
to the hourly rate for formal child care multiplied by the number of children with
care need, a value which we call informal child care value (ICV). If an house-
hold has children with di↵erent net child care needs (because of their di↵erent
ages), its total child care need can be grouped in child care needs associated with
di↵erent ICVs. For the care allocation process, the household will separate its
child care needs into two groups: child care need with ICV higher than the social
care hourly rate; and child care need with ICV lower than the social care rate.
The higher-cost child care will be satisfied with informal care as much as possi-
ble; when the available supply is exhausted, the remainder will be satisfied with
formal care when the ICV is higher than the supplier’s hourly wage, and with
informal care otherwise (provided by taking time o↵ work). Once the higher-cost
child care need is satisfied, the lower-cost care will be preferentially satisfied with
formal care, unless enough informal supply exists to cover the need.
Once all the household’s child care needs are satisfied, the remaining avail-
ability of time and income for care within the household’s kinship network will
be used to satisfy the household’s social care need.
6 Social Policy Experiments
Given the importance of child and social care provision to many families, most
developed nations design and implement social policies intended to facilitate the
provision of care. Education policy also a↵ects child care provision, in that it
a↵ects the number of hours children spend in school. In this model, we included
the current child care, education and social care policies in force in the UK.
By altering related parameters within the model, we can simulate care outcomes
and costs under alternative social care policies, which makes this model a unique
tool for developing and evaluating policy interventions in this area.
In these early-stage results, we investigated the e↵ect on social care of four
policy interventions related to some key policy ‘levers’ where policy-makers at-
tempt to influence social care outcomes. We developed four potential policy
interventions in which some key aspects of UK social care policy are altered in
an attempt to reduce overall social care costs to UK society. In the first inter-
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vention, we increase the public social care cost contribution from 20% to 80%; in
the second, the hours of free government-funded childcare provided for children
aged 3 and 4 is increased from 20 to 32 per week; in the third, the level of care
need required to receive government-funded social care is decreased from 4 to 3;
and in the fourth, a new scheme is introduced in which the state pays 50% of all
social care costs. These four policy interventions are labelled Policy 1 through
Policy 4 in the Results section below,.
We assume that the four policies are implemented from simulation year 2020
and compare the outputs of these four policy scenarios with the benchmark
no-policy scenario over the period 2020–2050.
7 Results
Here we present the outcomes of a representative ‘benchmark’ simulation and
compare these to the e↵ects of possible social policy interventions.
Fig. 1. Population and tax payers. Fig. 2. Total social care need.
Figure 1 shows the population and the proportion of tax-paying agents. Al-
though the population keeps growing from 1960 to 2050, it grows at a decreasing
rate. The working-age population grows more slowly, with a noticeable decrease
after 2020. The social care e↵ects of these demographic trends can be seen in
Figure 2, where we can see the relentless and steady growth of social care need,
with a slight increase in the growth rate around the year 2000. Our simulations
show social care need reaching a level almost six times higher than 1960 by the
year 2050.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the per capita hours of social care received.
The growth in the average social care received is generally in line with social
care need until the final 10-12 years of the simulation, where a declining trend
begins. This decrease is reflected in the rapid growth of unmet social care need
shown in the same period in Figure 4. In this figure, we can clearly distinguish
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Fig. 3. Average hours of social care deliv-
ered per week.
Fig. 4. Hours of unmet social care needs
per week.
three periods: a period of slow growth before 2000; a period of rapid but steady
growth in the period 2000-2040; and a sudden increase in the last decade of the
simulation.
Fig. 5. Unmet social care need by policy. Fig. 6. Total unmet social care need (2020-
2050).
In the next six figures, we will consider the e↵ects of our social policy exper-
iments on some social care related outcomes and will compare these outcomes
with those of the benchmark scenario. For each outcome considered, we will
present two figures: the first shows the dynamics over time; and the second
summarizes the overall post-intervention e↵ect (i.e. the sum of the outcome of
interest over the period 2020-2050). Figure 5 shows the policy interventions’ ef-
fects on unmet social care need. We can see that all the policy interventions
reduce unmet social care need, although the 50% government contribution to
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social care costs (Policy 4 in the graph) is clearly the most e↵ective intervention
in this regard. Figure 6 shows clearly that the total e↵ects of the first three policy
interventions on unmet social care need over the period 2020-2050 are roughly
similar. The fact that the two child care policies (Policy 1 and 2 in the graphs)
have a positive e↵ect on unmet social care need, is a clear example of policies’
spillover e↵ects – unexpected side e↵ects of a policy intervention that can be
di cult to spot prior to implementation.
Fig. 7. Public social care by policy. Fig. 8. Total public social care (2020-
2050).
Another example of a spillover e↵ect can be observed in Figure 7 and Figure 8,
showing the policy interventions’ e↵ects on public social care. The reduction of
the care need level required to get public social care (Policy 3 in the graphs)
is clearly the intervention that most a↵ects the amount of public social care
provided. However, the two child care policies (Policy 1 and 2 in the graphs)
have a similarly sizable e↵ect on this outcome. The reason for this spillover
e↵ect is that, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, these two child care policies
have a positive e↵ect on unmet care need, which a↵ects the agents’ progression
to the most critical level of care need and thus reduces the number of people who
are eligible to receive public social care. Although the government contribution
to the cost of social care (Policy 4 in the graphs) has a similar e↵ect on the level
of unmet care need, this e↵ect is counterbalanced by the fact that making social
care cheaper increases the number of people who are not eligible for public social
care (because they can now pay it by themselves).
Having seen the e↵ects of these policies on care provision, we now turn our
attention to the policies’ cost. Figure 9 shows that although the 50% government
direct contribution to social care cost is the most e↵ective policy for reducing
unmet social care need, it is also the most expensive. Moreover, we can see
that the 80% government contribution to child care is the least cost-e↵ective
intervention among the first three interventions: its cost is notably higher than
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Fig. 9. Total policy cost (2020-2050). Fig. 10. Hours o↵ work to provide for so-
cial care (2020-2050).
the cost of Policy 2 and 3, although its e↵ect on unmet social care need is not
significantly di↵erent.
Figure 10 shows the e↵ects of the policy interventions on the hours the agents
take o↵ work in order to provide social care. We can see that while the 50%
government direct contribution to social care cost is the most expensive policy
intervention, it also reduces by about a factor of four the number of hours that
working people take o↵ work to provide for social care (because under this policy,
it becomes more convenient for households to pay for care than to take time o↵
work). This example shows that comparisons of policy cost-e↵ectiveness must
take into account social and economic e↵ects, as well as direct financial costs.
Further, this example shows that ABM can be a valuable tool for social policy
evaluation by enabling more nuanced comparisons of policy e↵ectiveness and
cost.
8 Conclusions
Here we have presented a detailed agent-based model of child and social care in
a simulated UK population. We propose that this model can serve as a valuable
tool for policy development and evaluation, as it explicitly models the complex
interactions between child care and social care provision, as well as the negoti-
ations that happen within families as they decide whether and how to allocate
their time and money to care provision. The results show that, as a consequence
of this detailed modelling of individual-level decision-making and the e↵ects of
macro-level social policies, we are able to provide more sophisticated evaluations
of policies that illuminate not only their impact on government finances, but
their social and economic impact as well.
In future work, we intend to continue to refine this modelling framework to
allow users to more easily construct policy scenarios for evaluation. We will also
collaborate with social care policy experts and researchers to more accurately
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parameterise model processes. Once the simulation framework is more mature,
we will seek to provide more detailed and robust analyses of proposed real-world
policy interventions directed at child and social care, both within the UK and
elsewhere.
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